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I. Introduction
Those who do not have power over the story that dominates
their lives, the power to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke
about it, and change it as times change, truly are powerless,
because they cannot think new thoughts.
–Salman Rushdie
Cognitive research reveals that humans structure and understand
1
experiences in narrative form. What this means is that we force facts
into a story so that we can understand what happened, what will
happen, as well as to decide what to think of what happened and will
happen. The primary tool used to accomplish this is a stock story.
2
Humans view the world through stock stories, which allow us to
interpret and comprehend everyday events based on the minimal
facts with which we are provided, without constantly having to
3
analyze or question what we are doing. Stock stories allow us to
make decisions based on minimal facts because they supplement
those facts with assumptions about how the world works and how the
current events should play out. As a consequence, stock stories
provide an interpretive framework for comprehending the
significance of new circumstances, guiding an individual’s
interpretation of what happened, and shaping that individual’s
judgment regarding what should happen in the future.
Since stories function as a cognitive shortcut that supplements
facts in a given situation and incorporate the dominant values in a
4
given society, a lawyer who relies only on analytical reasoning will
not be as effective in persuading a legal audience as the lawyer who

1. Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and in a Galaxy Far,
Far Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on Pure Logic in
Appellate Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 257 (2009);
Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 717
(1994); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984); Brian J. Foley,
Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics, and Factual Realism, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 17, 55 (2008).
2. Lopez, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 10.
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incorporates stories into his or her strategy. Lawyers are trained to
6
value logical argumentation; laypersons are not. Consequently,
7
narrative is a powerful tool for persuasion. Therefore, in order to
persuade a legal audience, whether it is a judge or jury, a lawyer must
be able to identify the potential stock stories that may be triggered by
the facts of a client’s case and avoid harmful stock stories and the
8
unfavorable embedded knowledge structures associated with them.
The lawyer must be able to couch the client’s story in terms of a
favorable stock story or, at least, manipulate the elements of the new
story in a way that circumvents the unfavorable aspects of the stock
story. But what makes one narrative more persuasive or believable to
an audience than another?
When choosing among multiple stories, credibility judgments are
9
based on normative rationality. To enjoy narrative rationality, a
10
Narrative rationality is comprised of
story must seem plausible.
several threads that work together to weave a plausible story. The
first thread, narrative coherence, requires not only that a story be
11
complete but also internally consistent. It focuses on making sure
that the internal elements of the story (such as factual reconstruction,
12
character, setting, plot, etc.) make sense when viewed as a whole and
13
that the story and the evidence presented match up. The second
thread of narrative rationality is narrative correspondence. Narrative
correspondence requires that the structural elements of the story told
by the lawyer match up with the structural elements of a stock story.
Therefore, if a story is congruent with the stock story, it triggers the

5. Steven J. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth: The Ethics of Telling Stories to
Clients, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 961, 980 (2006) (hereinafter Johansen, This Is Not the Whole
Truth).
6. Id.
7. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267; Foley, supra note 1, at 40.
8. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 296.
9. Elizabeth Fagans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading
Practice, 15 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEG. WRITING INST. 3, 20 (2009); Steven J. Johansen,
Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?: An Essay on the Ethical Limits of Applied Legal
Storytelling, 7 J. OF THE ASS’N. OF LEG. WRITING DIRECTORS 63, 64 (2010) (hereinafter
Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?).
10. BERNARD JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 11 (1988).
11. J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion,
14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53, 64 (2008); Fagans & Falk, supra note 9,
at 20.
12. Jonathan Yovel, Running Backs, Wolves, and Other Fatalities: How
Manipulations of Narrative Coherence in Legal Opinions Marginalize Violent Death, 16
LAW & LIT. 127, 131 (2004).
13. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
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contextual presuppositions held by the audience and will seem
14
plausible and persuasive. The third thread of narrative rationality is
narrative fidelity. Narrative fidelity concerns whether the substance
of the story comports with the embedded knowledge provided by the
15
stock story that it triggers. Fidelity focuses on whether the story
accurately portrays social reality and satisfies the audience’s
16
expectations regarding how the story should play out.
When a stock story is so pervasive that it will not allow a lawyer to
ignore it, or a more favorable alternative story does not exist, a
lawyer can present the client’s story from an alternative perspective
that will not evoke the embedded knowledge structures triggered by
17
The lawyer can accomplish this by
the unfavorable stock story.
tinkering with the different threads of narrative rationality to improve
the persuasiveness of the story he or she tells. In this article, I will
suggest that the principles of narrative coherence, correspondence,
and fidelity can help the lawyer whose client does not fit comfortably
within one of our culture’s stock stories (e.g., the big bad wolf who
wasn’t really bad). Specifically, the lawyer who limits the client’s story
to the facts leading to the litigation focuses on the persuasive power
of narrative coherence by ensuring that the story is plausible, as all
aspects of it mesh with one another. On the other hand, the lawyer
who shifts from a narrow to a broader view of a case will rely on the
persuasive power of narrative correspondence by mapping a cultural
myth onto his or her client’s story. Finally, by creating friction
between the client’s character and the outcome associated with a
stock story, the lawyer can draw on the persuasive power of narrative
fidelity and shift the reader’s expectations about how things should
turn out.

II. Why Narrative Frameworks are Necessary for More
Effective Persuasion
Cognitive researchers have discovered that human perception and
cognition require interpretive frameworks on which to construct

14. Rideout, supra note 1, at 67; Yovel, supra note 12, at 131.
15. WALTER R. FISHER, HUMAN COMMUNICATION AS NARRATION: TOWARD A
PHILOSOPHY OF REASON, VALUE AND ACTION 105 (1989); Rideout, supra note 12, at 70.
16. Johansen, This is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 982; Rideout, supra note
11, at 70 (quoting FISHER, supra note 15, at 64).
17. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267; Linda Berger, How Embedded Knowledge
Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative
And Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 299–300
(2009).
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meaning and reality. Hence, humans comprehend new experiences
19
by fitting them into interpretive frameworks called schemas.
Schemas are cognitive frameworks that contain and organize an
20
individual’s expectations and understanding of the world. Schemas
allow an individual to assess new situations and ideas without having
21
to interpret them anew and prevent an individual from having to
expend cognitive energy to
22

map out inferences and relationships for every new situation.
Thus, schemas are cognitive shortcuts that convert new
scenarios into events that are within an individual’s scope of
23
experience because they ‘help an individual understand
people, events, objects, and their relationships to each other in
a way that is meaningful ‘based on what [that individual has]
come to believe is natural through experience within a
24
particular culture.’
An individual requires more information than that supplied by an
25
unfamiliar situation to construct the meaning of that new situation.
Schemas offer this additional information because they tap into an
individual’s inherent knowledge and provide an explanation that goes
26
beyond the information that is currently before the individual.
Therefore, schemas are constantly, and unconsciously, shaping an

18. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 259; Sherwin, supra note 1, at 717.
19. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 259; Clive Baldwin, Who Needs Facts When You’ve
Got Narrative? The Case of P, C & S v. United Kingdom, 18 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 217,
236 (2005); Berger, supra note 17, at 264.
20. Ronald Chen and Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1133 (2004) (quoting
MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS & IAIN WALKER, SOCIAL COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED
INTRODUCTION 34 (1995)).
21. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 700; Berger, supra note 17, at 265.
22. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 259 (quoting Berger, supra note 17, at 265).
23. Id.; Berger, supra note 17, at 265.
24. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 259 (quoting Berger, supra note 17, at 265).
25. Id. at 260; Sherwin, supra note 1, at 700–01.
26. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 260; Sherwin, supra note 1, at 701. For example, it is
not problematic when we are told that John went to a party and woke up the next morning
with a headache, though no explanation is given as to why John had a headache the
morning after a party, this is not a problem. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 700. A schema will
provide an explanation for these events: it is commonly known that people drink too much
alcohol at parties and feel hungover the next morning. Id. at 700.
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individual’s perception of new situations and affecting what he or she
27
sees, thinks, and feels.
A narrative, or story, functions as a cognitive framework where
28
multiple schemas are operating at once.
Humans comprehend
concepts expressed in terms of narratives better than those expressed
29
as abstract principles. Thus, narratives are crucial to an individual’s
30
As a
ability to comprehend a series of chronological events.
consequence, humans are predisposed to arrange experiences in story
31
form. In fact, narratives are an inherent way for humans to make
32
sense of their experiences.
33
A stock story, which is sometimes referred to as a myth, is a
mechanism by which the members of a culture can interpret certain
34
35
experiences and give them social meaning.
Stock stories
accomplish this by functioning as a template for a wide variety of
36
similar stories to follow. This template supplies the individual with
the ordinary course of events and allows the individual to predict the
37
outcome. Also, stock stories cast people in particular roles that
serve as templates for the characters that we may encounter in a given
38
situation. Thus, stock stories serve as recipes that allow individuals
to predict the types of characters they might come in contact with in a
particular situation, what will happen during the course of that
particular situation, and what they will need to do in response to

27. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 260; Sherwin, supra note 1, at 700, 717; Berger, supra
note 17, at 262, 266.
28. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 260.
29. Id. at 261.
30. Berger, supra note 17, at 266; ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER,
MINDING THE LAW 30–31 (2000).
31. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 45 (1990); ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY
OF THE TRIAL 159 (1999); Rideout, supra note 11, at 57.
32. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 257, 261.
33. Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor and Authority, 77
TENN. L. REV. 883, 889 (2010). Stock stories are also called “master stories,” “metastories,” “scripts,” and “archetypes.” Id.; Berger, supra note 17, at 268; Foley, supra note
1, at 40; Rideout, supra note 11, at 59.
34. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 261; Berger, supra note 18, at 268; Judith Olans Brown
et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor,
6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 457–58 (1996).
35. Rideout, supra note 11, at 59.
36. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 261; STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE
FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 106–13 (2003); Steven L. Winter, Making the Familiar
Conventional Again, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1607, 1629 (2001); Berger, supra note 17, at 268.
37. Berger, supra note 17, at 268; AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 30, at 17.
38. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 262; Edwards, supra note 33, at 890.
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those particular circumstances. Furthermore, stock stories provide a
social evaluation of the events that occur. As a result, once a stock
story has been triggered, the individual’s judgments will be based on
assumptions derived from the social knowledge embedded in that
story rather than on the unique characteristics of the current
40
situation. Furthermore, the outcome suggested by the stock story
41
will seem to be the natural result of the events that preceded it.
Once the biasing effects of the stock story have been triggered, the
only way to change the individual’s mind is to present the individual
with evidence that is inconsistent with the expectations or inferences
42
created by the interpretive framework.
Because stock stories perform an essential role in forming an
individual’s judgments about the outcome of a case, they serve an
43
important part in the legal process. As a result, stock stories can be
a hazard for an unsuspecting lawyer since they operate
subconsciously to free us from the need to think critically, reinforce
traditional cultural views, guide our judgments and evaluations in new
44
situations, and make certain preordained outcomes seem inevitable.
Consequently, lawyers must be able to recognize when the facts of
45
their client’s case trigger one or more stock stories. They must also
39. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 262; Berger, supra note 17, at 266.
40. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 263.
41. Id.
42. Id.; Chen & Hanson, supra note 20, at 1229–30.
43. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 264; Rideout, supra note 11, at 54.
44. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 265 (footnote omitted).
45. Id.; Berger, supra note 17, at 305; Edwards, supra note 33, at 884, 891.
A particular set of circumstances often will trigger more than one potential stock story. A
particular situation
is not always understood as “like” only one or a limited number of stock
structures. . . . [A situation] often takes on new and important meaning
when matched with a seemingly unrelated stock structure. [For
example,] [m]uch was learned about dolphins by comparing them to
humans and not just to sharks.
To accommodate this open-endedness, [an individual] employs a system
of qualifiers. Qualifiers demonstrate the likeness of a happening and a
stock structure both by admitting the imperfection of the match and at
the same time by insisting strenuously (though often implicitly) on the
significant similarity.
Lopez, supra note 1, at 17–18. Individuals process new events by “comparing and
contrasting [them] with his available stock structures—by making likeness judgments.
‘This . . . [new event] is like ‘that’ stock structure if a limited number of representative
features of the [event] parallel closely enough [for the individual’s] purposes features of
the stock story.” Id. at 16. Thus,
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be aware of the potentially harmful effects that some stories may have
on their client’s case, and be able to find an alternative story that
reinforces views favorable to the client or manipulate the structure of
46
their client’s story to avoid those harmful effects.

III. How to Work with Stock Stories to Make your Client’s
Story More Persuasive than the Competing Story of the
Opposing Party
How stories are framed is extremely important to the success of a
47
lawyer’s case. And given that “different legal consequences can
48
follow from the choice of one story rather than another,” it is critical
that lawyers select the story that is most beneficial to their client’s
case. Thus, to be an effective advocate, a lawyer must recognize the
49
stock stories that the facts of their client’s case may trigger and also
recognize the potentially harmful effects that some of those stories
50
may have on their client’s case. Furthermore, “if one possible stock
story will further an outmoded cultural view harmful to the client’s
case,” the lawyer must “successfully match the client’s story to an
51
alternative story that reinforces views beneficial to the client.”
In the event that a suitable alternative stock story is not available,
a lawyer must present the client’s story from an alternative
perspective that will not evoke the embedded knowledge structures
52
triggered by the unfavorable stock story. The lawyer must tell a

[i]f [an individual’s] thought processes were monitored as he assimilated
into stock structures what goes on in [a situation], [he or she] would
encounter variations of the following theme: “This happening is
essentially like that stock structure.” “This happening is nearly like that
stock structure.” “This happening is loosely speaking like that stock
structure.” “This happening is in an odd sense like that stock structure.” .
. . In this sense, qualifiers compose a system of likeness statements that
allow [an individual] flexibility in determining whether features of “what
is” match features of a stock structure closely enough to allow “what is”
to be comprehended and organized.
Id. at 17–18.
46. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 265; Edwards, supra note 33, at 884, 891.
47. Kim Lane Scheppel, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2085
(1989).
48. Id.
49. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 265; Berger, supra note 17, at 305; Edwards, supra note
33, at 884.
50. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 265; Edwards, supra note 33, at 2.
51. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 265.
52. Id. at 267; Berger, supra note 17, at 299–300.
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“counterstory.” A counterstory “‘may overcome the mind’s natural
tendency to take [cognitive] shortcuts’ that transform unfamiliar
situations into events that are within an individual’s range of
54
experience” because they present the client’s circumstances from a
55
new perspective. Thus, counterstories can reveal a new or different
reality, “showing us that there are possibilities for life other than the
56
ones we live . . ..”
To avoid unfavorable embedded knowledge
structures, counterstories use techniques that short-circuit the
inherent structure and understanding that is provided by stock
57
stories. Counterstories present the information anew—they move
from the original view of the story to one that is more narrow or more
expansive, present contradictory information that creates friction
between the original story and the outcome that is not favorable to
your client, present facts out of context, tell the story from a
58
contrarian viewpoint, or create a new label or category.
When telling a counterstory because no suitable alternative stock
story is available, a lawyer must remember that the story he or she
59
tells on behalf of the client must be plausible to the audience. The
60
story must “make sense.” To make sense, a story must unfold in a
61
logical manner and the characters must act as we expect them to act.
Simply put, a story must match up with the audience’s understanding
62
of how the world usually operates. The lawyer must convince the
audience that the events in the client’s story “could have happened
63
that way.” The story must be credible, more credible than the story
told by the other party. So what makes one story more credible than
another? Some narrative theorists believe that judgments about
64
credibility are based on narrative rationality.

53. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2414 (1989).
54. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267 (quoting Berger, supra note 17, at 300).
55. Berger, supra note 17, at 300 (construing AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note
30, at 1).
56. Delgado, supra note 53, at 2414; Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267.
57. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267.
58. Id.; Berger, supra note 17, at 299–300.
59. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 268; Rideout, supra note 11, at 66.
60. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?, supra note 9, at 67.
61. Id.
62. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 268 (quoting Rideout, supra note 11, at 66).
63. Rideout, supra note 11, at 66 (quoting BURNS, supra note 31, at 168).
64. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?,
supra note 9, at 64.
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A. Narrative Rationality

It is important to note that the court is not concerned with the
truth of the story—as it is not possible to measure truth in objective
65
terms—but rather is concerned with the plausibility of the story.
66
Does the story ring true? Thus, the story that is told and the way
that story is told will have substantial impact on the perceived
67
credibility of the story. The story selected, the elements of the story
(such as setting, plot, and character), and the amount of detail
provided will all have a bearing on the audience’s judgment about the
68
story. Additionally, the central events of a story must relate to each
69
Furthermore, some
other in a coherent fashion to be credible.
contextual detail, which may be irrelevant to the basic story line, must
accompany those events in order to place them in a context that the
70
audience can recognize. What this means is that, to be persuasive, to
71
resonate with the audience, a story must have narrative rationality.
The concept of narrative rationality is comprised of three aspects—

65. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 11. Remember, stories do not have to be true to be
believable. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist, supra note 10, at 67. “Fiction can
be believable, and the truth can seem implausible, or downright impossible.” Id. For
example, in Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?, Steven Johansen relates a story that a cab
driver shared with him during a tour of Northern Ireland. Id. at 66. According to the cab
driver, Colonel Sanders was in Ireland during World War I, became ill, received medical
care from a Protestant nurse, and as a result, became an ardent supporter of the Protestant
cause and donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to the UDA, one of the most violent
terrorist organizations in the Western world. Id. Johansen relates that he was surprised to
learn this before the cab driver admitted that the story was not true, that he had told it to
show that “[p]eople will believe anything if you tell a good story.” Id. at 67. Johansen
posits that after hearing the cab driver’s story, people, including himself, believe that
Colonel Sanders “might have supported a terrorist organization even though the claim is
completely false and contrary to everything they might have ever heard about Colonel
Sanders” because “the story [made] sense. The characters acted as we would expect them
to act [and t]he storyteller seemed credible.” Id.
66. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 11. Credibility is a function of the evidence as a
whole, not a “matter of individual witnesses or individuals items of testimony.” Id.
67. Rideout, supra note 10, at 64 (quoting W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S.
FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT
IN AMERICAN CULTURE 89 (1981)).
68. Id. (quoting BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 67, at 89 n.4).
69. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 11–12.
70. Id. Jackson notes that, while some level of detail is needed to provide context
and believability, one should avoid providing so much detail that the basic storyline is
submerged. Id.
71. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?, supra note 9, at 67–68. Again, it is
important to keep in mind that “the persuasiveness of a story does not turn on its truth. It
turns on its narrative rationality—its logical coherence, its correspondence to audience
expectations.” Id. at 68.
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narrative coherence, correspondence, and fidelity. Stories that fail
to persuade are lacking in one or more of these areas.
1.

Narrative Coherence
73

Coherence is the primary characteristic that provides legal
74
narratives plausibility and credibility. The more coherent the story,
75
the more probable it will seem. When faced with competing stories,
an audience is persuaded less by “Bayesian probability calculi of
76
77
discrete events” than by the story that seems more probable. This
means that the audience is persuaded more effectively by a story
when the “factual reconstruction, character reconstruction, and other
objects of narration make sense in a more holistic, gestalt manner
than that suggested by a body of doctrine preoccupied with technical
‘admissibility,’ ‘relevance,’ and ‘weight’ of information-bytes, which
78
are principle concerns of the law of evidence.” In order to have
79
narrative coherence, a story must accomplish two things. It must be
80
internally consistent and it must be complete.
First, legal storytelling demands internal consistency because the
81
“full story, the ‘real’ story is seldom told.” Adjudicators construct
stories out of the story framework suggested by the lawyer and the
82
evidence that has been presented. Thus, for a story to have internal
consistency, the various elements of the story must match up and the
83
story framework and the evidence presented must fit together.
Constructing a story requires the audience to make inferences, and
the audience can only make those inferences when the underlying
84
story structure is internally consistent. Therefore, the elements of
72. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20.
73. Narrative coherence is generally treated as a synonym for “narrative probability”
when discussing the characteristics of narratives. Rideout, supra note 12, at 64.
74. Yovel, supra note 12, at 129; Rideout, supra note 11, at 64. Yovel notes that the
need for coherence is “hardly a novel claim: the forebearer of all western treatises on
literary theory—Aristotle’s Poetics, written in the fourth century b.c.e.—asserts the ‘unity
of plot’ as a principal poetic postulate . . ..[U]nity is . . . the narrative crux around which
the action builds.” Yovel, supra note 12, at 129.
75. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
76. Yovel, supra note 12, at 131.
77. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
78. Yovel, supra note 12, at 131.
79. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64; Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20.
80. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64; Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20.
81. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
82. Id.
83. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
84. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64–65.
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85

the story must seem related to each other. Further, the concept of
internal consistency extends beyond the elements of the story
themselves and includes consistency between the story framework
86
provided by the lawyer and the evidence that has been presented. If
the elements of the story are consistent, and the story and the
87
evidence are consistent, the story will be more likely seem true.
However, if the parts of the story or the story and the evidence
88
contradict each other, the story will likely seem implausible. The
lack of internal consistency will impede the audience’s ability to allow
for relationships and connections between the story’s parts;
89
consequently, the story will seem implausible.
90
Second, the story must be complete. Even if a story is internally
91
consistent, it will be unconvincing if it is incomplete. Completeness
measures whether sufficient facts are present to ground the inferences
92
that the audience will need to make and whether the parts of the
93
story seem adequate when considered as a whole. When making the
inferential steps necessary to construct a story, the audience must rely
94
on embedded knowledge structures, like stock stories, for guidance.
If the story structure fails to contain all the expected elements, then
the audience’s ability to reference embedded knowledge structures
95
breaks down.
In sum, a legal audience is more likely to find for a party who
presents the facts as part of a coherent story rather than as a jumble
96
of facts with nothing to bind them together. The more coherent a
story is, the more internal consistency and completeness it enjoys, the
more persuasive the story will be. Additionally, a highly coherent

85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 65; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 528 (1991).
87. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64–65.
88. Id. at 65.
89. Id.
90. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
91. Rideout, supra note 11, at 65.
92. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; Rideout, supra note 11, at 65; BENNETT &
FELDMAN, supra note 67, at 44–45.
93. Rideout, supra note 11, at 64.
94. Id. at 65; BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 67, at 44–45.
95. Rideout, supra note 12, at 65; BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 67, at 44–45;
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 86, at 528.
96. Rideout, supra note 11, at 66 (quoting Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court:
Trial Procedure and the Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559, 562 (1991).
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story will make it more likely that the audience will accept a party’s
97
story regardless of the “informational content of the evidence.”
2.

Narrative Correspondence

Narrative correspondence, sometimes referred to as external
98
narrative coherence, also plays an important role in a story’s
99
A story enjoys narrative
plausibility and persuasiveness.
correspondence when it satisfies the audience’s sense that the events
100
could have happened that way and is congruent with what the
101
The audience’s
audience knows typically happens in the world.
sense of what happens in the world is based on stock stories and the
102
course of events that are inherently associated with them.
The story must correspond to what “could” happen, or what
“typically” happens, not to what actually happened. A decisionmaker determines what “could” happen by relying on a cache of
background knowledge provided by a set of stock stories rather than
103
by undertaking an empirical assessment of actual events.
Stock stories allow us to organize experiences, even in the
presence of limited information, because they are unconscious
cognitive frameworks that are automatically invoked to comprehend
104
new information. Additionally, stock stories are highly generalized
105
to cover a broad range of factual situations. They are not objective
representations of reality, but rather are idealized representations
that effectively characterize some, though not all, of the varied
106
Once a
situations that humans confront in their day to day lives.
lawyer has triggered a stock story, he or she may “tap[] into the

97. Id. (quoting Lempert, supra note 96, at 562).
98. Yovel, supra note 12, at 130; Rideout, supra note 11, at 67; JACKSON, supra note
11, at 58–59. Commentators refer to narrative correspondence as external narrative
coherence because it “relies on relationships with something outside the trial story itself.”
Rideout, supra note 11, at 67.
99. Rideout, supra note 11, at 66.
100. Id. (quoting BURNS, supra note 31, at 168).
101. Id.
102. Id.; Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20; BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 67, at
57. Thus, while narrative correspondence “may sound like a kind of reality check on the
story being constructed at trial, . . . correspondence is structural, not referential or ‘truthbased.’” Rideout, supra note 11, at 67.
103. Id.
104. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 20–21.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 21.
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‘stock’ information and combine[] it with ‘new information,’” to tell a
107
more concrete story based on the particular facts of the client’s case.
Narrative correspondence requires a comparison of the content of
the story told by the lawyer with the content of other stories that form
108
the audience’s pool of social knowledge. Thus, a party’s story will
seem plausible if it is congruent with the stock story it triggers and
109
with the contextual presuppositions held by the audience. When a
story fits with what the audience knows of the world from stock
stories, it has narrative correspondence, which makes the story more
plausible and persuasive.
3.

Narrative Fidelity

How does a legal audience decide between competing stories
when both equally enjoy internal consistency, completeness, and
110
According to Christopher Rideout, narrative
correspondence?
111
fidelity is the deciding factor.
To possess narrative fidelity, the
audience must entertain the notion that some outcomes are more
112
legitimate than others. Narrative fidelity is based on the audience’s
113
personal evaluation of the plausibility of the story. Consequently,
fidelity “persuades the audience to make a comparative judgment
about the competing narratives based not just on stock [stories] or
abstract legal or moral principles, but on practical judgments about
what the larger community would deem the right thing to do in the
114
case.” Thus, when a story has communal validity or relies on shared
107. Id.
108. Rideout, supra note 11, at 67 (quoting JACKSON, supra note 10, at 58–59).
109. Id.; JACKSON, supra note 10, at 58–59; Yovel, supra note 12, at 131. These
contextual presuppositions include “connotations and associations invoked by the stock
story, which supply the party’s story with meaning.” Yovel, supra note 12, at 130.
Furthermore, it is important to remember that “[t]he narrative is plausible, and
persuasive, to the extent that it bears a structural correspondence to one of these stock
scripts or stories, not to the extent that it ‘really happened.’” Rideout, supra note 11, at
67.
110. Rideout, supra note 11, at 69.
111. See id. at 69–78.
112. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 22 (quoting Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive
Dimension of the Agon between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2225, 2257 (1989)).
113. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 982.
114. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 22. The audience’s practical judgment “grasps
not the accurate objective characterization of a situation in theoretical terms but
something far more difficult to describe.” Rideout, supra note 11, at 74. These practical
judgments are a type of “intuition of experience” or “nonformal intelligence” that lead
“many honest and sensible judgments . . . [to] express an intuition of experience which
outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions—impressions which
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communal norms, it enjoys narrative fidelity and will be more
115
persuasive than a story that does not possess that characteristic. As
a result, narrative fidelity relies on social values as much as it relies on
116
reasoning. Thus, while the audience may consider whether the facts
presented by the lawyer are reliable and whether the conclusions
drawn from them seem plausible, the story’s fidelity is measured by
the extent to which the story is consistent with the audience’s
117
expectations and experience. The story will be more persuasive if it
matches up with the audience’s personal sense of how the events
118
should unfold and how the story should end.
If the story has
fidelity, the audience will instinctively want the client to receive
119
justice.
At first glance, narrative fidelity seems very similar to, if not the
same as, narrative correspondence. Because a story must be
consistent with the audience’s expectations and experiences to have
narrative fidelity, it seems as though narrative fidelity relies upon
stock stories to transmit mental or social models of what happened
120
Narrative correspondence concerns
and what should happen.
whether the structural elements of the story (i.e., setting, plot,
character, etc.) comport with the stock stories that have been
121
triggered by the facts of the client’s case. Narrative fidelity, on the
other hand, looks beyond whether the structural aspects of the story
correspond with the stock story that has been triggered to whether
the story accurately represents social reality and, therefore, provides
122
Thus, narrative fidelity assesses
a good basis for belief or action.
123
the substance of the story, whereas narrative correspondence

may lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth.” BURNS, supra note 31, at 209–
10 (quoting Justice Holmes in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585,
598 (1907)).
115. BURNS, supra note 31, at 217, 218; Rideout, supra note 11, at 74.
116. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 982; Rideout, supra note
11, at 77. Narrative fidelity has an evaluative component to it, which forces the audience
to “make ‘comparative judgment[s] about the relative importance of the norms that the
two positions represent’” when deciding which competing narrative to accept. Rideout,
supra note 11, at 73.
117. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 982.
118. Rideout, supra note 11, at 69 (quoting FISHER, supra note 15, at 64).
119. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 22 (quoting Winter, supra note 36, at 2257).
120. Rideout, supra note 11, at 70.
121. Id. at 67.
122. FISHER, supra note 15, at 105; Rideout, supra note 11, at 70.
123. Rideout, supra note 11, at 70, 72. When “assessing the substantive worth of a
story,” the audience does so “not in terms of its appeal to abstract universals like the truth,
and not in terms of its ability to translate into formal, logical propositions about social
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matches the structural elements of the client’s story with those of the
124
stock story that has been triggered.
In sum, a story possesses narrative fidelity when it comports with
125
the audience’s common sense. Narrative fidelity is more than just
the structural matching of the parts of the client’s story with the
structural aspects of the stock story. It is a consideration of whether
the substance of the story comports with what the audience knows of
the world based on the audience members’ personal experience.

IV. Techniques That May Suggest a Different, More Favorable
Outcome for Your Client When Dealing With a Negative
Stock Story
As discussed previously, when a stock story that is not favorable
to the client is triggered by the facts of the case, and a suitable
alternative stock story is not available, a lawyer must tell a
counterstory that presents the client’s story from a different
perspective. This new perspective must be one that will not evoke the
unfavorable embedded knowledge structures triggered by the
126
unfavorable stock story. Counterstories use techniques that shortcircuit the inherent structure, understanding, and evaluation that is
127
provided by the stock story. These techniques include moving from
the initial view of the story to one that is more specific or more
general, presenting contradictory information, taking facts out of
128
context, or taking a contrarian view.
Two of the techniques for circumventing a stock story will be
examined in this section. These techniques include moving from the
initial view of the case to one that is more specific or more general
and presenting contradictory information. When a writer moves from
a more specific view of the story to a more general one, or vice versa,
he or she is manipulating narrative rationality by emphasizing either
129
narrative coherence or narrative correspondence. By emphasizing

reality.” Id. at 72. Rather, the audience bases its comparison on “a literally indescribable
structure of norms, events, and possibilities for action.” Id. at 74.
124. Id. at 70.
125. See BURNS, supra note 31, at 216; Rideout, supra note 11, at 75.
126. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267; Berger, supra note 17, at 299–300; Delgado, supra
note 53, at 2414.
127. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 267.
128. Id.; Berger, supra note 17, at 299–300.
129. See generally Yovel, supra note 12. Yovel refers to narrative coherence as
“internal coherence” and narrative correspondence as “external coherence.” See id. at
131.
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one over the other, a writer can tell very different stories in the
130
With regard to presenting
context of a single legal case.
contradictory information, this section will focus on using
characterization to make a different outcome from the negative one
associated with the stock story seem not just legitimate, but natural.
A. Manipulating Narrative Coherence and Narrative Correspondence to
Tell a Story That is More Favorable to Your Client

In order for a story to convince an audience, it must appeal to
embedded knowledge structures, like stock stories and myths, shared
131
by members of the same community. But which culture’s or class’s
132
stock stories are systematically imposed by the courts?
Whose
conventions and values do we live by? Middle-class witnesses and
parties typically offer testimony that can be translated into a
conventional story form that is understood by the average white
133
On the other hand, members of
middle-class audience member.
subcultures, often referred to as “outsiders” by academics, often do
134
not share the same cultural context as “insiders.” Outsiders have a
different history, a different set of background experiences and a
135
different set of understandings than “insiders.” As a result, when an
outsider’s actions are taken out of context, they often seem odd to
insiders; the actions taken by the outsider are not the actions that the
136
insider would have engaged in under similar circumstances. In fact,
an outsider’s “failure to cast [his or her] viewpoint in the conventional
imagery typically will result in [his or her] stories and arguments
being treated as unintelligible if not unintelligent, the product of
137
muddled thinking and an underdeveloped sense of justice.”
Accordingly, outsiders regularly fail to provide evidence that an

130. Id. at 139.
131. The teller of the story and the members of the legal audience must share social
knowledge. See JACKSON, supra note 10, at 69.
132. Lopez, supra note 1, at 37.
133. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 69.
134. See Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.
135. Id. Stated another way, some members of the legal audience (a juror or a judge)
may not share with outsiders the “cognitive routines for presenting information in storycoded forms.” JACKSON, supra note 10, at 68.
136. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096. This is the point at which “racial and other
stereotypes enter the judgmental process. However, it is not generalized racial stereotypes
which influence judgments, but rather racial stereotypes in relation to particular types of
behavior, if and when such behavior is in issue within the story structure.” JACKSON,
supra note 10, at 69.
137. Lopez, supra note 1, at 49.
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audience can translate into a conventional story. Consequently, the
outsider’s inability to tell a conventional story may cause the audience
139
to reject truthful accounts of the outsider’s actions.
Furthermore,
even stories that enjoy narrative coherence may be rejected by an
audience if “the [story]teller and the audience do not share the
norms, experiences, and assumptions necessary to draw connections
140
As a result, outsiders may fear the court
among story elements.”
141
system and despair of receiving justice.
An audience may find it hard to accept an outsider’s story
“without knowing more about how the situation fits into a context
142
other than the ‘obvious’ insider’s one.”
Consequently, narrowing
legal stories to just those particular events at issue will have a
tendency to exclude much of the evidence that outsiders rely on to
143
On the other hand, some outsiders’
explain their points of view.
stories can be placed in a more sympathetic light if they are set in a
broader context rather than beginning and ending with an account of
144
By offering a
“the trouble” as most legal narratives generally do.
wide-angle view of the social landscape in which the individual events
occurred, the writer can provide the audience with the information
145
This
necessary to better understand the actions of the outsider.
phenomenon allows extremely different stories to be told based on
seemingly identical facts that compete for persuasiveness by
appealing more to either narrative coherence or narrative
146
As a result, narrative coherence and narrative
correspondence.
correspondence “may collide,” as emphasizing one more than the
147
other “generate[s] a distinct story . . . with little or no conjunction.”
When broadening the context in which the story is told to extend
beyond the particular events of the litigation, a writer emphasizes
148
This broader context emphasizes
narrative correspondence.
narrative correspondence because correspondence relies on the
embedded knowledge structures shared by members of a community.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

JACKSON, supra note 10, at 69.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Lopez, supra note 1, at 49.
Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.
Id. at 2097.
Id. at 2096.
Id.
Yovel, supra note 12, at 139.
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 133–34.
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By presenting the story in a broader context, the writer hopes to tap
into shared stock stories, myths, and experiences, or at the least, to
present a context in which the insider can come to understand the
outsider’s actions. Further, by mapping the stock structure onto the
structure of the client’s story, the writer is attempting to tap into the
persuasive power of the stock story. However, if a legal writer wishes
to narrow the focus of the story to the particular facts of the case or to
the facts relevant to the law, the writer should focus less on narrative
149
Whereas
correspondence and more on narrative coherence.
narrative correspondence evokes connotations and associations that
supply the story with meaning, narrative coherence “works through
culturally-entrenched notions of sequentiality, causation, and action
150
When focusing on narrative coherence
to form the story’s plot.”
rather than correspondence, a writer will provide a narrower context
in which to view the facts of the case, focusing narrowly on the set of
events that gave rise to the trouble in the case and “on what made
151
those events happen.” No broader context will be given than that
necessary to make sense of the story’s events and to make the story
seem plausible to the audience. The writer will focus on internal
reconstructing the event and appealing to widely shared assumptions
152
about how the world operates.
Two examples of cases in which narrative coherence and
correspondence were manipulated in order to relate very different
153
stories are included below. The first case, Rusk v. State, involves the
154
appeal of a conviction for rape. The second case, Ze’ev v. State of
155
Israel, concerns an appeal from an Israeli’s conviction for the
156
manslaughter of a Palestinian shepherd.
1.

Rusk v. State

In Rusk, Eddie Rusk was convicted of raping a woman he had
157
met at a bar, identified only as Pat, in 1977. Pat gave Rusk a ride
149. Id. at 132.
150. Id. at 131.
151. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095.
152. Yovel, supra note 12, at 132.
153. 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
154. Id. at 625.
155. CrimA 26/89 Ze’ev v. State of Israel 43 (4)PD 631 [1989] (Isr.).
156. Yovel, supra note 12, at 132 (discussing Ze’ev v. State of Isreal, CrimA 26/89
Ze’ev v. State of Israel 43(4) PD 631 [1989] (Isr.)). The author has been unable to obtain
a copy of the opinion. She has relied on Yovel’s discussion and explanation of the case in
her explanation of Ze’ev.
157. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 625.
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158

home. During the course of the rape, Pat verbally voiced her lack
159
On appeal, a
of consent, but she did not physically struggle.
majority of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the
conviction on the basis that the state had failed to present evidence
that Rusk’s behavior was sufficient to cause a reasonable fear that
160
overcame Pat’s ability to physically resist.
Judge Wilner
161
dissented.
The majority’s technique when writing the legal narrative for
Rusk v. State was fairly typical of legal opinions. The traditional legal
narrative tends to emphasize narrative coherence, focusing primarily
on the particular events surrounding the litigation and providing only
those contextual facts needed to understand those outcome
determinative facts. A traditional legal narrative begins by examining
when the interaction between the parties began, traces the course of
events that lead to the litigation, and ends when the parties part ways.
Again, legal audiences tend to share white middle-class values and
162
knowledge structures, which work their way into opinions.
The story the majority told when relating the facts of the case
focused narrowly on the events of the night that Pat claimed Rusk
163
The court ventured outside those bounds only to
raped her.
provide contextual information that added to the internal consistency
of the story that the court related. The story began at the time and
164
In the first
place that Pat and Rusk first became acquainted.
paragraph of the facts, the majority explains that Pat was a twentytwo-year-old woman who was separated from her husband but not yet
165
It goes on to explain that Pat and one of her friends
divorced.
“went bar hopping” on the night in question and that Pat met Rusk at
166
the third bar she attended. The majority’s story goes on to provide
details regarding Pat and Rusk’s interactions that evening,
emphasizing facts that showed Pat’s failure to struggle and
167
characterizing Rusk’s actions as lacking force. The majority notes
158. Id.
159. Id. at 625–26.
160. Id. at 628.
161. Id. at 629 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
162. See supra notes 115–116, and accompanying text.
163. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095.
164. Id.
165. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 625.
166. Id.
167. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095. Rather than characterizing Rusk’s conduct as a
“light choking,” it would be characterized as a “heavy caressing.” Id. at 2086; Rusk, 406
A.2d at 628.
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that Rusk asked Pat for a ride home from the bar and that Pat
168
agreed. Pat initially refused Rusk’s request that she come up to his
apartment, but when Rusk took the keys out of the ignition, opened
her car door and again asked her to come up, Pat told him she would,
169
Pat then followed Rusk
though she claimed to be scared of him.
170
into the boarding house, up the stairs, and into Rusk’s apartment.
“When they got into [Rusk’s] room, he said that he had to go to the
bathroom and left the room for a few minutes. [Pat] made no attempt
to leave. When [Rusk] came back . . . [Pat] took off her slacks and
171
removed his clothing because ‘he[ ] asked her to do it.” Pat stated
172
that she was begging him not to rape her and that she was crying.
When she started to cry, Rusk put his hands on her throat and began
173
to “lightly choke” her. The court later noted that this light choke
could have been “a heavy caress” based on statements made at oral
174
argument. The story ended when the two parted company for the
175
night and Pat reported the rape to the police.
Throughout the majority’s opinion, the reader gets the sense that
the judges just could not fathom Pat’s lack of physical resistance if she
really did not wish to consent to Rusk’s advances. This makes sense
given the Victorian taboos and myths that have traditionally
176
surrounded rape, as well as the fact that rape laws conform to the
male experience of violence rather than to the female’s experience of
177
invasion, fear, and humiliation. “The law expects a raped woman,
like a battered wife, to behave like a man when threatened: to try to
defend herself even at the risk of death. The law demands that a
178
woman behave like a reasonable man and fight back.”
Consequently, as most judges in 1979 tended to be men, “[i]t is
probably hard for most men . . . to imagine not fighting back when
attacked unless their passivity results from a weakness of will or a

168. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 625.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 625–26.
172. Id. at 626.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 628.
175. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095.
176. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 633 (1979) (Wilner, J., dissenting).
177. CAROL TAVRIS, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMAN 112 (1992).
178. Id. at 113. Rape laws do “not demand that a man behave like a reasonable
woman and understand the difference between consent and coercion, between the words
‘yes’ and ‘no.’” Id.
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failure of nerve, neither of which are remediable in law.” The social
bias against rape victims and the judges’ inability to comprehend Pat’s
lack of resistance meant that the court reversed Rusk’s conviction for
rape. Essentially, the majority was unable to understand Pat’s
motivation in not physically resisting Rusk.
Furthermore, because the judges were unable to comprehend
Pat’s failure to struggle, they themselves struggled to make sense of
the events of that night. In an effort to create internal consistency
with regard to most of the events of the story, the majority includes
the fact that Pat was separated from her husband but not yet
180
181
However, the next
divorced, the relevance of which is unclear.
fact the majority mentions is that Pat and her friend were “bar
182
When Pat’s marital status is considered with regard to
hopping.”
the majority’s characterization of her behavior that night as “bar
183
hopping,” its relevance becomes clear.
The combination of these
two “facts” suggests Pat’s motivation that night by creating the
“underlying suspicion, for which there is absolutely no support in the
184
This “context”
record, that Pat was somehow ‘on the make.’”
appeals to society’s widely held assumptions about how a woman
trolling the bars looking for a man to bed behaves. This “context”
shades the reader’s understanding of Pat’s subsequent actions in
agreeing to give Rusk a ride home, following him up to his apartment,
remaining in the apartment while he left the room, taking off her
clothes at his request, and engaging in sexual acts. The fact that she
was initially “on the make” causes Pat’s actions to appear consensual
despite her repeated verbal objections.
The majority’s note that the testimony of two of Rusk’s friends
185
“painted the episode in a manner more favorable to the accused” is
also designed to suggest that Pat was “on the make.” Why else would
the majority make such a statement when it goes on to acknowledge
that it need not recite the testimony of Rusk’s friends because the
court was “obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable
179. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.
180. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 625.
181. Id. at 633 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 625.
183. Id. at 632 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 626. Presumably the evidence that favors Rusk’s version of the fact is that
his friends observed him “walking down the street arm-in-arm” with a woman. State v.
Rusk, 424 A.2d at 720, 723 (Md. 1981). One friend, David Carroll, testified that the
woman “was hanging all over him.” Id. He also testified that he was “fairly certain” that
the woman was Pat. Id.
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186

to the prosecution”? What need was there for the majority to make
the initial statement? None, unless the majority was trying to create
consistency between the facts of the case and its unstated version of
what happened.
The dissenting judge, on the other hand, took a different
approach. Rather than narrowly focusing on the trouble between Pat
and Rusk, Judge Wilner put Pat and Rusk’s story in a broader
187
context. In addition to clarifying some of the facts presented by the
majority and supplementing other facts regarding the events of the
night in question, Judge Wilner zoomed out to provide a more
expansive view of the case and offered a more panoramic opening
188
shot of the social landscape in which this individual rape took place.
In an effort to allow the audience (which remember is primarily male)
to understand Pat’s actions, the dissenting judge showed how the
circumstances in which Pat found herself and her response were
typical of women who are raped.
How did Judge Wilner make Pat’s circumstances seem
characteristic of those experienced by rape victims? First, the judge
noted that “[n]early half of [all] rapes occur when this one did,
189
He also disclosed that “as in
between 8:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m.”
[Pat’s] case, approximately one-third of rape victims had come into
190
contact with their assailant voluntarily.” These statements address
two often biasing facts in rape cases and implicitly suggest that it is
normal for a woman, like Pat, to get raped late at night and for her to
know her attacker.
Next, Judge Wilner addressed Pat’s failure to struggle. He began
the discussion by revealing that law enforcement agencies throughout
the country advise women not to fight back against their attackers
191
because this increases the risk of serious bodily harm. Additionally,
the judge made it clear that “because most women’s experience and
expertise with violence tends to be minimal, they are unlikely to
192
He disclosed that the types of
engage in physical combat.”
resistance most often employed by rape victims are verbal resistance

186. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 626.
187. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.
188. Id. at 2095.
189. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 634 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095; Rusk, 406 A.2d at 634–635 (Wilner, J.,
dissenting).
192. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 634 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS, 2 THE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, at 4 (1978)).
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and other forms of passive resistance, such as “crying, being slow to
respond, feigning an inability to understand instructions or telling the
193
rapist they are pregnant, diseased or injured.”
Finally, Judge
Wilner pointed out that, of the 12% of women who fight their
attackers, 71% of the victims were physically injured, with 40%
194
The judge
requiring hospitalization or medical treatment.
recognized that “[t]hese results indicate one possible danger of the
popular notion (and some [legal] requirements) that a victim of an
195
attack should resist to her utmost.” Although the wide-angle view
of the case presented by Judge Wilner “puts the events before the
court in a broader context than that normally invoked by legal
196
narratives,” this context allowed the audience to better understand
Pat’s reactions and to feel more sympathy for her than did the
majority’s story, which primarily focused on the events on the night of
the rape.
2.

197

Ze’ev v. State of Israel

Ze’ev was a Jewish settler in Shilo, a settlement located in the
198
199
Israeli-occupied West Bank. He was a shepherd. In 1988, Ze’ev
was convicted of manslaughter for shooting and killing one
Palestinian shepherd and wounding another in an incident that took
200
place on the outskirts of Shilo. The Palestinian shepherds had been
201
unarmed. On appeal, Ze’ev argued that he was justified in fearing
aggression from the Palestinian shepherds and shooting so as to scare
202
away “what he reasonably perceived to be a threat to his home.”
Additionally, Ze’ev argued that, prior to opening fire, he had shouted
at the Palestinian shepherds to go away and that they had responded
203
by cursing at him and moving in his direction.

193. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2095; Rusk, 406 A.2d at 634 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
194. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 634 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2096.
197. CrimA 26/89 Ze’ev v. State of Israel 43(4) PD 631 [1989] (Isr.). The author has
been unable to obtain a copy of the Ze’ev opinion. Therefore, in her discussion of Ze’ev,
she has relied on Jonathan Yovel’s description of the case in his article titled Running
Backs, Wolves, and Other Fatalities: How Manipulations of Narrative Coherence in Legal
Opinions Marginalize Violent Death. See generally Yovel, supra note 12.
198. Yovel, supra note 12, at 132.
199. Id. As ironic as it may be, Ze’ev translates in Yiddish to “wolf.” Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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The majority opinion is a lesson in narrative coherence. It focuses
narrowly on the “trouble” between Ze’ev and the two Palestinian
shepherds. It reconstructs the immediate events leading to the
204
shooting, examining the “internal sequential arrangement of the”
205
story. The majority relied on expert ballistic evidence in concluding
that Ze’ev, “in order to have fired the good many rounds that he in
fact did, began shooting immediately, taking no precautionary
206
The court reasoned that, based on Ze’ev’s “own account,
steps.”
the very short time span between first contact and the shooting—less
than a minute—could not have allowed for the preliminary steps he
claimed to have taken, such as shouting warnings, firing in the air,
207
etc.”
The majority’s decision “focuses on the narrative’s internal
208
integrity,” evaluating its temporal unity and coming to a decision
based on “widely-shared assumptions about how the material worlds
work,” particularly with regard to the passage of time and the
209
sequencing of events. The majority found Ze’ev’s version of events
to lack temporal unity—and thus plausibility—because the events
could not have occurred the way he said they did based on the short
period of time that had passed between Ze’ev’s first encounter with
the Palestinians and when he shot them.
The dissenting justice, on the other hand, did not narrowly focus
210
on the trouble between Ze’ev and the Palestinian shepherds.
Rather, the dissenting justice put the shooting in a broader context by
providing a more panoramic opening shot of the social landscape in
211
which this particular shooting took place. The minority opinion told
“the story of a secluded settlement populated by infants and women
212
and vacant of most of its men amidst a vast, menacing periphery.”
213
It “cite[s] several security threats and official notices to that effect.”
It goes on to present evidence of Ze’ev’s “generally mild character”
and accepts his assertion that he attempted to drive the Palestinians

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 132.
See id. at 132–33.
See id.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 132–33.
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away verbally and by shooting into the air before he shot in their
214
direction.
Though the additional facts about the settlement being secluded
and populated by women and children, the existence of many security
threats, and Ze’ev’s character are irrelevant in terms of the immediate
events surrounding the shooting, these facts are useful with regard to
the dissent’s creation of a context that is recognizable to the audience.
While the dissent does not indicate that Ze’ev was aware of the
215
existence of the security threats, his lack of knowledge is not
important. The seclusion of the settlement and the existence of the
threats are important for a few reasons. First, this context creates
sympathy for Ze’ev and the situation in which he found himself
(confronted by two potentially hostile Arabs in the outskirts of a
secluded Israeli settlement). Second, it allows the audience to feel
the “sense of urgency and anxiety” that Ze’ev presumably felt when
216
Finally, and most
confronted by two Palestinians outside Shilo.
important, the dissenting justice’s “reconstruction of events . . . uses
217
[narrative correspondence] to weave a story of its own.”
The
broader social context offered by the dissenting justice and the
reconstructed facts create a setting for the story of the shooting that
corresponds with an inherent knowledge structure with which most
218
Israelis are familiar—the myth of Tel-Hai.
The Tel-Hai story is a myth of Zionism that imparts a moral—
”beware the seemingly innocuous stranger approaching a secluded
219
dwelling, especially if the former is an Arab and the latter Israeli.”
The Tel-Hai myth tells of a secluded Galilee stronghold that was
attacked by Arabs who had initially pretended to be peaceful and so
220
The Arabs then assaulted and
were admitted to the stronghold.
destroyed the stronghold, killing eight military men and women who
221
defended it. Much like the United States’ defeat at The Alamo, the
military defeat and political situation that followed the Tel-Hai attack
had a solidifying effect, causing Israelis to identify with one another

214. Id.
215. Id. at 133.
216. Id. The dissenting justice manages to omit Ze’ev admission that he did not feel
fear when he saw the Palestinians. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 133–36.
219. Id. at 134.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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222

and unite as one people.
The Tel-Hai myth “became an
interpretive key for [Israelis to use when evaluating] future
223
experience, transcending” history.
The story the dissenting justice tells fits closely with the Tel-Hai
224
myth. While the Tel-Hai myth is never explicitly mentioned in the
225
minority opinion, the dissenting justice’s “tacit invocation of [the
226
In fact,
Tel-Hai myth] underlies his story of the Ze’ev shooting.”
“[t]he minority opinion in Ze’ev owes much of its persuasiveness to
reliance on [the] tacit invocation of Tel-Hai as a mythical parable—
but only among” those members of the audience who share cultural
227
knowledge of the myth.
Members of the audience who share
cultural knowledge of the myth “are expected to perform the
associative link from the narrative pattern to several ‘baits’ or
228
‘anchors,’ thus realizing what the story in Ze’ev is really all about.”
These baits or anchors were the dissenting justice’s emphasis on how
secluded Shilo was, the numerous security threats that existed at the
time of the shooting, and “the menace emanating from the victims
229
These facts invoke, without
rather than from the perpetrator.”
explicitly referencing, stories of Arab aggressors invading secluded
230
Israeli communities, specifically the Tel-Hai myth.
The implicit
invocation of the myth supplies the Ze’ev case “with meaning in a
231
manner powerful enough to preempt other factual findings,”
particularly those with regard to the extremely short period of time
that elapsed between Ze’ev’s initial encounter with the Palestinians
and his shooting in their direction. This is due to the fact that “most

”

222. Id. at 133, 135. “Gettysburg,” “Pearl Harbor,” “D-Day,” and “September 11th
(or “9/11”) are other American examples of “code-names” like The Alamo that instantly
bring to mind “commonly shared stories of bloody events” that have become “the myths
that constitute and solidify collective identity.” Id. at 133. Like the Tel-Hai story, these
myths also impart a moral less. Id. at 134. For instance, “in American consciousness,
Pearl Harbor would function as an instant invocation of the traitorous belligerence of
foreigners and an imperative justification for righteous aggression no matter its precise
historiography.” Id.
223. Id. In fact, the Tel-Hai attack has become so mythologized that “Israeli
schoolchildren are sometimes surprised to find out that the place Tel-Hai actually exists.”
Id.
224. Id. at 135.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 134.
227. Id. at 135.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 133.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 135.
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of the [audience], though decidedly not all, would share the commonsensical knowledge of what happens when menacing strangers emerge
from those unknown stretches beyond civilization [and approach] a
232
secluded dwelling.” However, those members of the audience who
do not share the Tel-Hai myth, outsiders like the Palestinian victims
in this case, “would be perplexed by the causation implied by the
minority’s story, because that relies on cultural expectations coded in
mythical patterns that they do not share and that are not spelled out
233
in the narrative itself.”
“[T]he minority opinion in Ze’ev is replete with historical and
mythological layers” that form a context that is much more expansive
234
But, though these
than that provided by the majority opinion.
references are purposeful and proactive, they are not explicit. The
dissenting judge does not explicitly reference Tel-Hai because he
does not wish to engage the audience in a dialogue about the myth
235
The dissenting
and the applicability of its moral lesson in Ze’ev.
judge does not provide “an opportunity for reflection or exchange. . . .
[Rather,] [t]he reader is counted on to form certain responses” as a
result of the minority opinion’s implicit allusions to the Tel-Hai
236
myth. “The majority opinion [on the other hand,] does not neglect
237
context.” It just narrows the context in which the shooting occurred
to that which immediately surrounded the shooting rather than
focusing on a broader context that allowed for the manipulation of
the facts. “To an extent, the majority employed a formalistic
approach, signifying that no amount of importation of—or reliance
on—external cultural input may change its . . . approach to
238
The bald facts demonstrated that the events could not
facticity.”
have occurred the way Ze’ev claimed they occurred. The majority
recognized that Ze’ev’s story lacked temporal unity and did not allow
a broader view of society in the West Bank to affect or alter its view
of the bald facts. Consequently, the majority and minority opinions
each provided a comprehensive account of what happened during the
shooting. However, the stories that the majority and minority
opinions told varied widely due to the justices emphasizing different
aspects of narrative rationality. Because the majority opinion
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 135–36.
Id. at 136.
Id.
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emphasized narrative coherence, and focused on the internal
consistency of the elements of the story and temporal unity, it
concluded that Ze’ev had committed manslaughter. The minority
opinion, on the other hand, emphasized narrative correspondence,
linking Ze’ev’s story with the moral lessons imparted by the Tel-Hai
myth. These lessons provided Ze’ev “with a probable expectation of
aggression” from the Palestinian shepherds and “preempt[ed]
responsibility” for his shooting the Palestinians and killing one of
239
them.
3.

Summary

The Rusk and Ze’ev cases demonstrate that a lawyer can
manipulate narrative coherence and narrative correspondence to tell
extremely different stories based on the same set of facts. A focus on
narrative coherence emphasizes the immediate facts that lead to the
litigation. It underscores the need not only for the facts to match up
with one another, but also for the parts of the story to fit together.
When the facts match up and the parts of the story fit together, the
story seems plausible. On the other hand, a focus on narrative
correspondence broadens the social context in which the immediate
facts are situated. This may be done to assist an insider audience in
comprehending an outsider’s actions. It may also be done to tap into
embedded knowledge structures that the insider audience shares in
an effort to avoid a problem with the narrative coherence of a story.
Such problems would include when the client’s claimed facts are not
plausible because they do not entirely match up.
The Rusk case illustrates how a wide angle approach to the
context in which a case arises might work to the advantage of
outsiders. “[T]he claims of outsiders are often not heard in law
because the experiences and reactions and beliefs and values that
outsiders bring to the law are not easily processed in the traditional
240
structures of legal narratives.” By offering the legal audience a
broader context in which to evaluate the events of the case, however,
a lawyer may provide the audience with sufficient information to
understand why an outsider acted in a different manner than how the
241
Thus, emphasizing narrative
insider audience would have acted.
correspondence over narrative coherence can sometimes be an
effective technique when a lawyer represents an outsider whose

239. Id.
240. Scheppel, supra note 47, at 2097.
241. Id. at 2096.
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actions may not be readily comprehensible by a white, middle-class
audience.
A panoramic view of the social context in which a case arises,
which emphasizes narrative correspondence, “may not always . . .
242
work to the advantage of outsiders.” The minority opinion in Ze’ev
provides an example where the focus on narrative coherence
benefited the insider party rather than the victims, who were
outsiders. The provision of a broader social context was used in the
minority opinion to circumvent the facts because Ze’ev’s story lacked
internal consistency with regard to the passage of time and the
sequence of events. This lack of consistency led the majority to
conclude that Ze’ev was unjustified in his shooting of the Palestinians
and to convict him of manslaughter. The minority opinion, on the
other hand, tacitly appealed to a stock story that supported Ze’ev’s
expectation of aggression from the Palestinians and excused him from
shooting them. The dissenting justice buried argument in the
expanded contextual facts that were supplied and circumvented the
restraints on the meaning that were given to the bald facts as they
243
existed.
B. Drawing on Narrative Fidelity to Create Conflict Between the Client’s
Character and Audience Expectation Regarding How Story Should End

Narrative coherence demands that the various elements of a story
work together for a story to be persuasive. These elements include
character, conflict, plot, point of view, setting, theme, voice, and
244
245
style. Characters, arguably the most important element of a story,
are “free agents, with minds of their own . . . who engage in the ‘what
246
Stock stories cast people,
happened and why’ of the story.”
institutions, and ideas as characters, each filling a particular
247
archetypal role.
Accordingly, characters function as “trope[s] for
248
When a particular stock story is triggered, the
human identity.”
audience expects to encounter a stock of characters, including heroes,
242. Id. at 2096–97.
243. See Lopez, supra note 1, at 33.
244. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 268; see Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The
Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 127, 137 (2008); J.
Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction
Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Fact Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459, 466 (2001).
245. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 274. See Chestek, supra note 244, at 142.
246. Carolyn Grose, Storytelling across the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, from
Clinic to the Classroom, 7 J. ASS’N. LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 37, 43 (2010).
247. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 187; Edwards, supra note 33, at 890.
248. Grose, supra note 246, at 43.
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villains, tricksters, mentors, kings, mothers, demons, sages, children,
companions, gatekeepers, damsels in distress, shape shifters, and
249
clowns. And, just as with “plots, characters tend to register with [an
audience] as familiar, each one is expected to embody one or more
250
general truths” about people in general or the world.
“Although stock stories may cast people, institutions, and ideas in
archetypal roles that serve as templates for characters, the lawyer still
needs to develop those characters so that they seem true to the reader
251
rather than a two-dimensional cardboard cutout.”
To achieve
narrative coherence, and ultimately narrative rationality, the litigants
must “emerge as fully realized individuals . . . rather than cardboard
252
prototypes.” Consequently, the characters need to be developed so
253
that they feel real to the audience.
Character can be developed in numerous ways. It can be
established directly by revealing an individual’s thoughts, needs,
dreams, fears, weaknesses, experiences, circumstances, and
254
motivations.
Character can also be demonstrated by “describing
[an individual’s] physical ‘appearance, clothes, possessions, body
language, etc., which act as indices of class, character, status, and
255
256
social milieu.’” Character can be developed indirectly as well. It
257
For
can be developed indirectly through action and dialogue.
instance, how an individual responds to a conflict or struggles to
258
overcome adversity reveals something about his or her character.
259
This is true with regard to what the individual says as well.
However, though it is important to develop a character, when

249. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 275; Edwards, supra note 33, at 890; see also Ruth
Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the
Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767,
775, 778 (2006).
250. Grose, supra note 246, at 43.
251. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 276.
252. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 23.
253. Id. at 30.
254. Id. at 30–31.
255. Id. at 31. With regard to descriptions of body language, “there is a difference
between persons making eye contact and a person becoming aware that he or she is the
object of someone’s unblinking stare. The former suggests a moment of shared intimacy,
the latter an uncomfortable intrusion.” Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 275; Foley & Robbins, supra note 244, at 470.
259. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 31. That dialogue is a good measure of character
is demonstrated by the ancient Greek adage, “Speak, so that I may see you.” Id.
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engaged in character development, a lawyer should avoid information
260
overload. Rather,
character can be developed economically and elegantly
through use of selected details . . . Effective characterization
captures appropriate details in images, or in careful
descriptions, often through the selection of vivid details.
These enable the reader to pull the pieces together into a
composition—to construct the whole from the closely
observed details, and thus, to compose the character’s
261
character.
Furthermore, an audience can deduce more than just who an
individual is from his or her character. An audience can deduce why
a character has acted in a particular fashion and predict how that
individual is likely to act in future circumstances. An audience can
deduce why a character has acted in a particular manner by figuring
out the character’s motivations. This provides an explanation for
262
what has already happened in the story. Additionally, character can
263
The audience will be able to
foreshadow what will happen next.
explain what has already happened and predict what will happen by
“draw[ing] upon . . . stock stories, metaphors, and psychological
264
schema to look forward as well as to look back into the past.”
Recall that narrative coherence requires that the facts and the
265
client’s story match up.
What this means is, with regard to
character, narrative coherence demands that an individual act
266
consistently with his or her character. Thus, for narrative coherence
to exist, the character of the individual and the conduct that
267
individual engages in must comport with each other. The individual
must conduct him or herself in a manner consistent with his or her
character in order for narrative coherence to exist. For example, if
villains suddenly profess to be heroes, “we need a lot of persuasive

260. See Philip N. Meyer, Vignettes from a Narrative Primer, 12 LEGAL WRITING: J.
LEGAL WRITING INST. 229, 263 (2006). According to Meyer, “an overload of
psychological description and the baggage of too many identifying details may detract
from effective characterization, especially in legal narratives.” Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 264.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 33.
266. Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 981.
267. Fagans & Falk, supra note 9, at 33, 36.
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sub-plots about their lives to explain the transformation.”
If such
subplots are missing, the villian’s behavior does not make sense, the
story is not believable, and its persuasive effect falls apart.
When dealing with a stock story that has a resolution that does
not favor his or her client, a lawyer may be able to use the need for
narrative coherence with regard to character, the character’s conduct,
and the resolution of the story to the client’s benefit. By carefully
developing the character of his or her client in a way that creates
friction between who the character is and how the character is expected
to act according to the stock story, a lawyer may be able to change the
traditional resolution of the stock story that was triggered into one
that is more favorable to the client. In order to change the outcome
of the story in a manner that is plausible, the lawyer must develop the
character of the client in a way that makes the new, unexpected
behavior more believable than the behavior originally suggested by
the stock story because it is more consistent with the character’s
personality. The lawyer would need to demonstrate that this was the
only plausible course of action she could take given who the client is.
There was nothing else the client could do—any other action would
have been counter to whom and what she is. Thus, a lawyer must
develop the client’s character in such a way that the outcome the
lawyer is seeking seems more natural than that associated with the
stock story simply because of who the party is and how the party
would act.
Below is an example of how character development and narrative
fidelity can be used to circumvent the negative assumptions and
outcomes associated with a stock story. In the television series Buffy
269
the Vampire Slayer, the main character, Buffy Summer, fights
270
Since the episode
Dracula in an episode titled Buffy vs. Dracula.
occurred at the beginning of season five, the creator of the series
needed to find a way for the show to follow the Dracula storyline
without Buffy becoming a vampire. Furthermore, the creator of the
271
show needed to do this in a way that was true to the “Buffyverse.”
272
Following the discussion of Buffy vs. Dracula, this section explores

268. Johansen, This is Not the Whole Truth, supra note 5, at 981.
269. Buffy the Vampire Slayer (Mutant Enemy television broadcast 1997–2003).
270. Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Buffy vs. Dracula (Mutant Enemy television broadcast
Sept. 26, 2000).
271. Buffyverse, WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 20, 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffyverse.
The Buffyverse, also known as the “Whedonverse” or “Slayerverse,” is the fictional
universe in which the television series Buffy the Vampire Slayer is set. Id.
272. Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Buffy versus Dracula, supra note 270.
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appealing to narrative fidelity by creating friction between the
character of a client who is a battered woman and the negative
assumptions and beliefs associated with being a battered woman in
order to make a more favorable outcome seem natural.
1.

273

Buffy vs. Dracula

Most members of Western society are familiar with Bram Stoker’s
274
novel Dracula. We know generally what details to expect when we
see a remake or loose adaptation of the story. The general plot line
involves Dracula, a vampire, seducing women and turning them into
vampires. Because he puts them under his thrall, his female victims
do not resist his efforts but cooperate willingly. Dracula’s female
victims try to hide what has happened to them from their loved ones.
His victims willingly go to Dracula when he wants them. When he
seduces Mina Harker and begins her transformation into a vampire,
VanHelsing, an older gentleman with knowledge of the occult, and
Jonathan Harker, Mina’s husband, fight and kill Dracula to save
275
Mina.
In fact, the Dracula story is so ingrained in our culture that even
when a story features vampires, whether they are Dracula or not, we
know what to expect. Dracula serves as a myth, or cognitive short
cut, regarding vampires. We know that vampires drink blood; they
only come out at night; they tend to travel in a crate or other coffinlike container filled with their native soil; they have special powers
that allow them to turn into a bat, wolf, or mist, and to hold their
victims in thrall so the victim will cooperate with them; they
sometimes transform their victims into vampires; and they can be
killed by staking them through the heart.
Buffy the Vampire Slayer was a television series that ran from
276
The main character was Buffy Summers, a petite
1997 to 2003.
blond young woman who, at first glance, seemed like any other
teenager. She liked to shop, date boys, and hang out with her friends.
But Buffy had a secret. She was the “chosen one.” She was the one
girl in all the world who had been chosen to fight vampires and other
forces of darkness. She was more than “just a girl.” She possessed a
mystical power that made her faster, stronger than other people. She
was the slayer.

273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.
BRAM STOKER, DRACULA (1897).
Id.
Buffy the Vampire Slayer, supra note 269.
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Throughout the series, Buffy was portrayed as a physically and
emotionally strong, smart, witty, independent young woman who
took her responsibilities as the slayer seriously. She repeatedly saves
her classmates, her teachers, her mother, her friends, her boyfriends,
and even the world from vampires and demons. And, as is inevitable
for a vampire slayer, she encounters Dracula in an episode in season
277
five titled Buffy vs. Dracula.
a.

278

Synopsis of the Episode

The episode begins by showing Buffy lying in bed with her
boyfriend, Riley Finn. Unable to sleep, Buffy quietly gets out of bed
279
and goes out to patrol the cemetery. After staking a vampire, she
280
returns to bed with Riley. The next day, Buffy and her friends are
enjoying a day at the beach until Willow, a witch-in-training,
281
manipulates the elements to magically ignite the barbecue.
A
sudden thunderstorm erupts, forcing them to seek shelter from the
282
283
rain. Willow objects that she did not cause the storm. The scene
then switches to two delivery men in front of a residence; they are
unloading a large crate. One of the delivery men drops the end of the
crate and it cracks open a bit, expelling dirt. The man says, “Look at
284
this. The guy’s carting dirt around! Dirt. Man, rich people are . . ..”
His words are cut short when a clawed hand breaks through the wood
and attacks him. The scene fades away as the hand starts toward the
other delivery man.
The next time we see Buffy, she is back in the cemetery fighting
285
another vampire. The fight is a lively one. A man with dark eyes
materializes from mist, watching Buffy and the anonymous vampire
286
287
fight from a distance.
Buffy stakes the vampire.
As she struts
away, clearly pleased with herself, she slows down and looks around.

277. Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Buffy versus Dracula, supra note 270.
278. Some parts of the episode have been omitted from this synopsis. This synopsis
only focuses on the parts of the episode that either correspond with the Dracula story line
or develop Buffy’s character. Extraneous materials have been ignored.
279. Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Buffy versus Dracula, supra note 270, at 00:01–00:25.
280. Id. at 00:26–1:20.
281. Id. at 02:15–3:25.
282. Id. at 3:27–3:49.
283. Id. at 3:40.
284. Id. at 3:50–4:21.
285. Id. at 4:24–4:26.
286. Id. at 7:24–7:55.
287. Id. at 7:56–7:58.
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The man says to her, “Very impressive hunt. Such power.” Buffy
responds, “That was no hunt. That was just another day on the job.
289
Care to step up for some overtime?” The man, who has long dark
hair and wears a black cape that is red on the inside, tells her, “We
290
are not going to fight.” Buffy replies, “Do you know what a slayer
291
292
293
is?”
The man responds, “Do you?”
“Who are you?” Buffy
demands. He answers, “I apologize. I assumed you knew. I’m
294
295
Dracula.” Buffy exclaims, “Get out!” The scene then switches to
the credits.
When we return from the credits, Willow and Xander, Buffy’s
stalwart companions, are walking through the cemetery chatting.
Xander asks Willow if she wants “to see if Buffy’s hanging around the
296
The scene returns to Buffy and Dracula. Buffy is
headstones?”
saying, “So let me get this straight. You’re Dracula. The guy, the
297
298
count?” He responds, “I am.” She mocks him, “And you’re sure
this isn’t just some fan boy thing? ‘Cause I’ve fought more than a
299
couple pimply overweight vamps who called themselves Lestat.”
Dracula tells her that she knows who he is just as he knows who she
is. When she expresses surprise, Dracula informs Buffy that she is
known throughout the world. He states that he came to Sunnydale to
meet “the renowned killer.” Buffy expresses her displeasure,
explaining that she prefers “the term slayer.” She reminds Dracula
that she’s the good guy. He responds, “Perhaps, but your power is
rooted in darkness. You must feel it.” Buffy replies, “No. You know
300
what I feel? Bored.” She lunges forward to stake him in the heart.
Dracula turns into mist and reappears behind her. When she tries to
stake him a second time, Dracula again turns into mist. Buffy chides,
301
As Buffy spins around, looking furtively
“Okay, that’s cheating.”
for Dracula, Willow and Xander approach. Buffy tells them to get
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 8:02–8:17.
Id. at 8:18–8:25.
Id. at 8:26–8:28.
Id. at 8:29–8:30.
Id. at 8:31–8:32.
Id. at 8:35–8:36.
Id. at 8:38–8:44.
Id. at 8:46–8:47.
Id. at 8:53–9:22.
Id. at 9:26–9:32.
Id. at 9:33–9:34.
Id. at 9:35–9:42.
Id. at 9:45–10:36.
Id. at 10:37–10:47.
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out of there, but it is too late. She sees Dracula starting to materialize
behind them and warns them. They turn around and see Dracula.
Xander immediately starts mocking Dracula’s attire and accent.
302
Buffy intervenes, “Xander, I’m pretty sure that’s Dracula.” Dracula
303
declares, “This is not the time. I will see you soon.” He then turns
into a bat and flies away.
The next time Dracula sees Buffy, he has entered her bedroom as
mist. When he coalesces into a man, Buffy wakes up and sits up.
After Dracula tells her that she is magnificent, Buffy replies, “I bet
you say that before you bite all the girls.” Dracula and Buffy
exchange some words, then Dracula orders Buffy to pull her hair
back. Buffy complies, but says, “This isn’t how I usually fight. You
think you can just waft in here with your music video wind and your
hypno eyes.” Dracula approaches her and sits next to her on her bed.
He runs his finger over the scar on her neck and comments, “You
have been tasted.” Buffy will not look at Dracula, but says, “He
was . . ..” Dracula interrupts her, “Unworthy. He let you go. But the
304
When Buffy objects, Dracula
embrace, his bite, you remember.”
orders, “Do not fight. I can feel your hunger.” He then bites her
neck. When Buffy wakes in the morning, she gets dressed. She is
standing in front of a mirror looking at her reflection. When she pulls
her hair back, she sees the puncture wounds from Dracula’s fangs.
She grabs a scarf and ties it around her neck to hide the marks.
Later, Buffy allows Xander, who has become a sort of Renfieldlike character under Dracula’s power, to lead her to Dracula’s
dwelling. When Buffy and Dracula meet, Dracula tells Buffy, “I
305
Buffy asks, “Why? Because I’m under your
knew you’d come.”
306
307
thrall?” She whips out a stake and says, “Well, guess again, pal!”
However, when Dracula orders her to put the stake down, she does so
automatically. “Right,” she says, “that was not you. I did that. I did
308
that because I wanted to. Maybe I should rethink that thrall thing.”
309
Dracula approaches her and Buffy tells him, “Stay away from me.”
Dracula mocks her, “Are you afraid I will bite you? Slayer, that’s

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 10:48–11:22.
Id. at 11:31–11:37.
Id. at 20:31–22:23.
Id. at 30:06–30:07.
Id. at 30:12–30:15.
Id. at 30:16–30:17.
Id. at 30:20–30:41.
Id. at 31:22–31:23.
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310

why you came.”
Buffy objects, “No. Last night, it’s not going to
311
312
“Any
happen again.” “Stop me,” Dracula says, “Stake me.”
313
minute now,” Buffy tells him, though not convincingly.
They
314
exchange words and Buffy tells Dracula that her friends are there.
He acknowledges that they are present, but seems unconcerned about
them. Dracula says, “You will have eternity to discover yourself. But
315
316
first, a little taste.” Buffy tells him, “I won’t let you.” He looks
317
meaningfully at her and says, “I didn’t mean for me.” Rolling up his
sleeve and slicing his wrist so that blood wells up out of it, Dracula
says, “All those years fighting us, your powers so near to our own.
And you’ve never once wanted to know what it is we fight for. Never
318
even a taste.”
When Buffy voices concern about becoming a
vampire if she drinks his blood, Dracula informs her that he had not
319
drank enough of her blood for her to change. He holds his wrist out
to her. She takes it, puts her lips to his wrist, and begins to taste his
blood. As she does this, he says to her, “Find it. The darkness. Find
320
your true nature.”
As she drinks Dracula’s blood, a montage of images flashes
through Buffy’s mind. She sees several images of the first slayer,
blood rushing through a vein, and many images of herself chasing and
staking vampires. “Wow,” she says and knocks Dracula across the
321
Dracula stands up and says, “You are
room, “that was gross.”
322
323
resisting.” “Looks like,” Buffy counters. “Come here,” Dracula
324
orders, “come to me.” Buffy responds, “You know, I really think

310. Id. at 31:24–31:33.
311. Id. at 31:34–31:40.
312. Id. at 31:40–31:44.
313. Id. at 31:45–31:46.
314. Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Buffy versus Dracula, supra note 270, at 31:47–31:59.
315. Xander, who is under Dracula’s power, is eating bugs like the lunatic Renfield
from the novel and trying to prevent Riley and Giles, Buffy’s watcher and teacher, from
interfering with Dracula’s plan. Id. at 25:21–26:00. While searching the mansion, Giles
falls into a pit with Dracula’s three sisters and seems to fall under their thrall, much like
Jonathan Harker in the novel. Id. at 33:30–34:10.
316. Id. at 32:00–32:41.
317. Id. at 32:45–32:47.
318. Id. at 34:12–34:30.
319. Id. at 34:34–34:38.
320. Id. at 34:35–35:39.
321. Id. at 35:00–35:55.
322. Id. at 35:57–36:00.
323. Id. at 36:01–36:03.
324. Id. at 36:04–36:07.
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325

the thrall has gone out of our relationship.”
Dracula demands,
326
327
“What is this?” Buffy answers, “My true nature. Want a taste?”
She and Dracula then begin to fight. Dracula turns into mist and
begins to coalesce on the other side of the room. Buffy runs in that
direction and grabs the stake she earlier laid on the table as she
passes by. When Dracula takes form, Buffy stakes him through the
328
heart and ask, “How do you like my darkness now?” Dracula turns
to dust as Riley, Xander, and Giles enter the room.
b. How Friction Between Buffy’s Character and Her Behavior
Undermined the Stock Ending of the Dracula Story

From the scene in which Buffy is lying restlessly in bed with Riley
329
to the scene when Dracula shifts into a bat, the writer is establishing
some necessary story elements. First, the writer is establishing the
plotline of the episode by introducing Dracula and having him
encounter Buffy. The plotline triggers the vampire myth as well as
the more specific Dracula story line. When the delivery men unload
the large crate at night during a storm, and dirt spills out of it when
330
they drop it, the audience knows what to expect even before the
331
Vampire! And when that
pale hand breaks through the wood.
332
vampire later identifies himself as Dracula, just like Buffy, the
333
audience begins to believe his claim when he turns into mist. The
belief that the vampire might be Dracula is reinforced when he later
334
turns into a bat.
The scene in the cemetery with Buffy and Dracula also makes the
audience aware that Buffy is the woman who has attracted Dracula’s
fancy; she is the one that he will seduce. A few scenes make this
apparent. When Dracula first materializes in the cemetery, he
335
He also tells Buffy that he came to
admires Buffy from afar.
336
Additionally, when Willow and
Sunnydale solely to meet her.

325.
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Xander interrupt them, Dracula informs Buffy that he will see her
337
later. Dracula seems not only interested in Buffy but captivated by
her.
The writer is also establishing Buffy’s character. When the
audience first sees Buffy, she is lying restlessly in bed beside her
338
boyfriend. She creeps quietly out of bed to go to on patrol in the
339
cemetery, where she soon finds a vampire to fight and kill. Buffy’s
fight with the vampire gives the audience the impression that this is
not the first time she has engaged in such behavior. As Buffy battles
340
the vampire, she demonstrates that she is a skilled fighter. This fact
341
is reinforced by her second fight with a vampire.
These fights,
coupled with her friends later referring to Buffy as “she who hangs
342
out in headstones,” reinforce the idea that Buffy regularly hunts
down vampires and slays them.
When Dracula introduces himself to Buffy, another side of her
personality is revealed—her independent, sarcastic streak. Buffy
does not just accept what some anonymous vampire tells her. When
343
he tells her he is Dracula, she doubts he is who he says he is. She
challenges him with some snarky comments and tries to kill him like
344
she would any other vampire. It is not until he transforms into mist
and rematerializes behind her that Buffy begins to suspect that this
345
could be Dracula.
But he had to act like Dracula before she was
willing to believe he might be Dracula.
In the next few scenes, from when Dracula materializes into
346
Buffy’s room to the point where he convinces her to taste his blood,
the writer is continuing to trigger the vampire myth and Dracula
storyline. The writer accomplishes this by showing Dracula enter
347
Buffy’s bedroom as mist, put her under his thrall, and bite her. The
Dracula storyline continues to be triggered when Buffy hides the bite
348
mark with a scarf and later goes willingly to Dracula’s lair.
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Id. at 11:31–11:37.
Id. at 00:26–1:20.
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Dracula’s seduction of Buffy, when he convinces her to taste his
349
blood and to consider his offer of eternal life, also furthers the
vampire myth and stock story.
However, while the writer is continuing to trigger the vampire
myth and Dracula storyline in these scenes, he is doing something else
as well. The writer is creating friction between the stock story and the
parallel story that he is telling with Dracula and Buffy. The new story
fits well with the stock story; it is what the audience expects from a
story that is based on the Dracula novel. But there is a problem. The
way Buffy is acting is not consistent with who the audience knows her
to be. Buffy does not cooperate with vampires. She does not just
passively sit there and let them bite her! She fights them. She kills
them. And she antagonizes them with snarky comments while she
does it. Buffy herself acknowledges the disparity between her usual
behavior and her response to Dracula when she tells Dracula that
350
sitting there and letting him bite her is not usually how she fights.
Even Buffy seems confused by her behavior.
The writer makes the contradiction between Buffy’s character and
her behavior even more apparent in the scene when Buffy and
Dracula interact after she has gone willingly to his lair. When Buffy
351
whips out the stake, it appears that she has found herself. It seems
that she was not under Dracula’s thrall, that she went willingly to him
only because she had a plan to kill him. However, when Dracula
orders her to put the stake down, and she obeys despite her own
352
wishes, the audience feels discomfort again. And this unease is only
partially due to the situation in which Buffy now finds herself.
Furthermore, when Dracula convinces Buffy to taste his blood, and
353
she concedes, the audience feels extremely uneasy. This isn’t Buffy;
Buffy would never consider becoming a vampire.
This audience response is precisely what the writer was going for.
Despite knowing that the female always succumbs to Dracula’s
seduction and that that very outcome is what the audience inherently
expects from a Dracula story, that outcome does not seem natural
here. In fact, it seems weird because who Buffy is as a person. She
would resist more. She would fight. She would kill Dracula, or at
least try to. It is this contradiction, between the inherent outcome of

349.
350.
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the stock story and how this story should end, that creates the
audience’s discomfort. They do not mesh.
The final scenes, from Buffy tasting Dracula’s blood to her male
354
friends entering the room, resolve not only the plotline but also the
audience’s unease. When Buffy tastes Dracula’s blood and the
images of the first slayer and Buffy killing vampires flash through her
355
mind, she remembers who she is. She remembers that she is strong.
She remembers that she is not a meek woman who sits passively by
letting men control her fate. She is the slayer. Then she begins to act
like herself. When she knocks Dracula across the room and tells him
356
that his blood is pretty gross, that is how the audience would expect
Buffy to act. When Buffy tells Dracula that the thrall has gone out of
357
their relationship, the audience applauds the return of Buffy’s
358
snarky side. And when Buffy finally stakes Dracula, the audience is
satisfied.
The audience is satisfied because that is how this story would end.
Buffy’s character demands this outcome. It would not be believable
for Buffy to succumb to Dracula’s seduction or for the men in her life
to have to save her from Dracula. Buffy is not saved by men; she
saves them. The friction that the audience felt between the Dracula
framework and parallel story has disappeared. It disappeared
because Buffy finally behaved as the audience expected her to and
the story ended in a way that seemed natural given her character.
The writer has deviated from the embedded knowledge structure
created by the Dracula storyline in a way that is not only plausible,
but in a way that his resolution of the events seems like the only
natural ending to the story. The outcome associated with the Dracula
plotline, where the female succumbs to Dracula and has to be rescued
by her husband and an aged gentleman with knowledge of vampires,
is made to seem strange in light of the fact that the female is Buffy
Summers. This new ending for the parallel story not only comports
with who Buffy is, but it also remains consistent with the more
general vampire myth.
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Re-characterizing Battered Women as Individuals Involved in a Power
Struggle with Their Batterers Rather Than as Victims of “Learned
Helplessness” in Child Custody Cases

A small number of highly publicized cases where women have
asserted the battered woman syndrome as a defense when accused of
killing their batterer have shaped and informed cultural images of
359
battered women. These cultural images of battered women and the
related assumptions about domestic violence have, in turn, affected
the substantive law in ways that shape society’s perceptions of
360
women. The “learned helplessness” phenomenon has been critical
361
to the success of women asserting the battered woman defense.
Learned helplessness is a psychological state where an individual feels
362
This psychological state
powerless to change her situation.
generally arises in response to persistent traumatic events, such as
363
domestic violence. Individuals suffering from learned helplessness
have learned to behave passively and submissively, even when
364
presented with an opportunity to help herself.
While the concept of learned helplessness has been instrumental
to the success of women asserting the battered woman defense, it has
365
been harmful to society’s perception of battered women. Learned
helplessness has contributed to a perception that battered women are
“pathologically weak, that is, too helpless or dysfunctional to” take
366
This image of battered
more rationale steps to save themselves.
women as pathologically weak and dysfunctional “has disserved
367
battered women in other legal contexts, such as child custody.” The
image of battered women as pathologically weak and dysfunctional
368
A
reduces the psychological complexity of the battered woman.
359. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1991); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories,
79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 988 (1991).
360. Mahoney, supra note 359, at 2; Abrams, supra note 359, at 988.
361. Mahoney, supra note 359, at 2; Abrams, supra note 359, at 988.
362. See LENOREE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 47–48 (1979);
Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.63.
363. WALKER, supra note 362, at 47–48; Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.63.
364. WALKER, supra note 362, at 47–48; Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.63. It often
seems to those hearing the stories of battered women that they were not as helpless as
they perceived themselves to be. WALKER, supra note 362, at 47–48. The battered
woman’s behavior, however, was determined by her cognitive mindset, not from what she
actually could or could not do. Id.
365. Abrams, supra note 359, at 988.
366. Id.; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 4.
367. Abrams, supra note 359, at 988; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 4.
368. Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.65; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 38.
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battered woman may be alternatively competent and forceful or
passive and submissive depending on the coercion to which she is
369
exposed. However, the concept of learned helplessness has molded
society’s perception of the battered woman into one that denies the
competent, forceful side of the battered woman. If the battered
woman is weak and passive in the context of domestic violence, she
must be weak and passive in all aspects of her life.
The image of battered women as pathologically weak and
dysfunctional has also hindered the social response to domestic
370
violence. It has hindered the social response to domestic violence
because it “fuels a potent social tendency toward denial of battery in
371
our society,” which causes some women to refrain from reporting
372
As a result, society underestimates the
domestic violence.
prevalence of domestic violence and leads those members of society
who are not in a battering relationship to perceive battered women
373
“as substantially different from themselves.”
When representing a battered woman in a context other than a
criminal trial for killing her batterer, a lawyer may struggle against
society’s perception of battered women. For instance, in a child
custody case, the image of a battered woman as weak and passive
may impact the custody decision. This is because society will assume
that if the battered woman suffers from learned helplessness, she
must be weak and passive in all aspects of her life. If the child is
unruly or if someone has alleged that the woman’s partner is abusive
of the child, then the common perception of battered women as weak
will haunt the client. Under circumstances where the child is unruly,
a mother who is also a battered woman will be viewed as too passive
and weak to take charge of the child and discipline him or her.
Similarly, in a situation where there are allegations that her partner is
abusing her child, the woman will again be seen as too weak to defend
the child or as too helpless to take the child and leave her batterer.
However, if the lawyer were to develop a more nuanced portrait
of his or her client, the lawyer could create friction between 1) the
way the legal audience would expect the client to act as a battered
woman and the assumed outcome of the situation and 2) the
character of the client. In developing a more nuanced portrait of the
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Abrams, supra note 359, at 988 n.65; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 30.
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client, a lawyer would characterize the client as generally strong and
competent, rather than weak and submissive. How would a lawyer do
this given the social view of domestic violence? First, a lawyer could
depict “the battering relationship as a struggle for power and
374
375
control,” with his client being one partner in such a relationship.
The lawyer could establish that, rather than being weak and
submissive, his client (and implicitly those like her) was battered
376
Her
when she was exercising too much power and authority.
partner had to put her in check, and he accomplished this by abusing
her. The lawyer could go on to support this characterization of the
battered woman as strong by demonstrating that his client is
competent and forceful in other areas of her life, such as at work or
school or when parenting.
By presenting the client as strong and capable and the battering
relationship as a power struggle, the lawyer may create friction
between how the legal audience inherently expects battered women
to act and how it would expect this battered woman to act.
Furthermore, the manner in which the legal audience would expect
the lawyer’s generally strong and competent client to act would
suggest an entirely different outcome than that indicated by the
common view of battered women. The audience would not predict
that this woman would be an ineffective parent due to her
helplessness and passivity. On the contrary, it would predict that she
would do all in her power to be an effective parent because she is
strong and exercises her power when needed.

V. Conclusion
In summary, because stock stories shape how a legal audience
thinks about and evaluates a given situation, lawyers must be aware
of the negative stock stories that may be triggered by the facts of their
clients’ cases. Lawyers must also be aware of the tools that are at
their disposal when their clients do not fall comfortably within the
confines of a stock story. One tool that a lawyer can use to
circumvent the negative effects of a stock story is accentuating either
narrative coherence or correspondence. By manipulating these
threads of narrative rationality, a lawyer can tell very different stories.
When emphasizing narrative coherence, a lawyer will narrowly focus
on the facts leading to the trouble and on tying all the elements of the
374. Abrams, supra note 359, at 988; Mahoney, supra note 359, at 43.
375. Abrams, supra note 359, at 989.
376. Mahoney, supra note 359, at 39; Abrams, supra note 359, at 991.
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story together so that it is plausible. When stressing narrative
coherence, on the other hand, a lawyer will map a cultural myth or
stock story onto the client’s case in order to appeal to its persuasive
power. A lawyer can map a myth onto his client’s case by opening
the lens to offer a broader view of the case that alludes to the myth.
Another tool that a lawyer can use to circumvent the negative
effects of a stock story or myth is creating a conflict between the
client’s character and the inherent expectations regarding how the
course of events should unfold and how the story should end. By
creating this friction, a lawyer can make a new conclusion seem more
natural than that associated with the stock story or myth. Thus, the
lawyer uses the contradiction to appeal to the persuasive power of
narrative fidelity. These tools will allow a lawyer to avoid the
negative effects of a stock story or myth.

